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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than
large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development
fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size
implied  by  industry  specific  production  technologies,  including  capital  intensities  and  scale
economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development
exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more
dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by
removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral











Finance Department, Room 3-257
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota




I.  Introduction 
Although a large literature suggests that financial development fosters economic growth, 
considerably less research examines the cross-firm, cross-industry distributional effects of financial 
development.
1  Some theories imply that financial development boosts economic growth by 
disproportionately fostering small firm growth.  If smaller, less wealthy firms face tighter credit 
constraints than large firms face due to greater informational barriers or high fixed costs associated 
with accessing financial systems, then financial development that ameliorates market frictions will 
exert an especially positive impact on smaller firms (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 
1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997).
2  In contrast, other research suggests that most small, less wealthy 
firms, especially in poor countries, cannot afford financial services, so that financial development 
disproportionately facilitates the growth of large firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).
3 
This paper assesses whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more 
than large firms and hence sheds empirical light on (1) debates concerning the distributional 
implications of financial development, (2) one mechanism through which financial development 
may affect aggregate economic growth, and (3) a large policy-oriented literature that stresses the 
importance of small firm growth for economic development.  In terms of public policies, the World 
Bank (1994, 2002, 2004) argues that small firms foster competition, innovation, and employment to 
a greater degree than large firms and has devoted more than $10 billion in the last five years toward 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2005) for a review of the literature on financial development and growth. Specifically, cross-country 
studies (King and Levine 1993; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000), firm-level studies 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), and industry-level studies (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Wurgler 2000) find that 
the level of financial development is positively related to growth and this relationship is not due only to simultaneity 
bias.  Aghion, P., Howitt, and D. Mayer-Foulkes (2005) find that financial development accelerates the speed of 
convergence toward a steady state, but does not influence steady-state growth. 
2 In these models, financial development that lowers information or transaction costs disproportionately benefits less 
wealthy entrepreneurs.  In terms of U.S. banks, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that efficiency improvements reduced 
fixed costs included in loan prices, helping small firms. 
3 Levine and Schmukler (2003, 2004) provide evidence that international financial liberalization has primarily benefited 
large, rich firms.  Also, local banking monopolies may foster close relationships between banks and small firms and   2
promoting small enterprises.  Rather than examining whether small firms per se accelerate growth, 
we examine whether financial under-development exerts a particularly onerous impact on small 
firms.  Furthermore, while considerable research suggests that finance is closely associated with 
economic growth, dissecting the mechanisms connecting finance and growth provides information 
on whether – and if so how -- financial development causes growth, or whether financial 
development is simply associated with fast growing economies.  Toward this end, this paper 
examines whether financial development accelerates growth by boosting small firm growth.  
Finally, as stressed above, financial development may have distributional implications.  This paper 
examines whether financial development is particularly good for large firms or small firms, or 
whether financial development has a balanced impact on firms of different sizes.  
We examine whether industries that are composed of small firms for technological reasons 
grow faster in economies with well-developed financial systems.  As formulated by Coase (1937), 
firms should optimally internalize some activities, but size enhances complexity and coordination 
costs.  Thus, an industry’s optimal firm size depends on that industry’s particular production 
technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001).  
Given estimates of each industry’s technological firm size, we use a sample of 44 countries and 36 
industries in the manufacturing sector to examine the growth rates of different industries across 
countries with different levels of financial development.  If “small-firm industries” – industries 
naturally composed of small firms for technological reasons – grow faster than “large-firm 
industries” in economies with more developed financial systems, then this suggests that (i) financial 
development boosts the growth of small-firm industries more than large-firm industries and (ii) one 
mechanism through which financial development accelerates growth is by fostering the growth of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
thereby increase credit availability to small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995).  If financial development intensifies 
competition and breaks these monopolies, it may also hurt small firms.   3
small firms.  Instead, if financial development disproportionately boosts the growth of large-firm 
industries, then this implies quite different distributional effects.  Finally, financial development 
may foster balanced growth, and therefore we would not find cross-industry distributional effects. 
More specifically, we extend the Rajan and Zingales (1998, henceforth RZ) methodology to 
examine whether financial development enhances economic growth by easing constraints on 
industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms.  RZ find that industries that are 
technologically more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately faster in countries with 
developed financial systems.  They measure an industry’s need for external finance (the difference 
investment and cash from operations) using data on large, public corporations in the U.S.  
Assuming that financial markets are relatively frictionless in the U.S., RZ identify each industry’s 
“technological” demand for external finance, i.e., the demand for external finance in a frictionless 
financial system.  They further assume that this technological demand for external finance is the 
same across countries.  Instead of only considering each industry’s technological dependence on 
external finance, we also examine each industry’s technological firm size.  We measure an 
industry’s “technological” composition of small firms relative to large firms as the share of 
employment in firms with less than 20 employees in the U.S.  Assuming that financial markets are 
relatively frictionless in the U.S., we therefore identify each industry’s “technological” firm size in 
a relatively frictionless financial system.  While conducting a large of number of sensitivity checks 
regarding the validity of this measure of technological firm size, we test whether industries that are 
technologically more dependent on small firms grow faster in countries with more developed 
financial systems. 
  The results indicate that small-firm industries grow disproportionately faster in economies 
with well-developed financial systems, which has two key implications.  First, the findings indicate   4
that financial development has cross-industry distributional ramifications:  Financial development 
exerts a particularly positive growth effect on industries that are technologically more dependent on 
small firms.  Second, the analyses advertise one mechanism through which finance influences 
aggregate economic growth: Financial development removes growth constraints on small-firm 
industries.  Our analyses suggest that large-firm industries are not the same as industries that rely 
heavily on external finance.  We control for cross-industry differences in external dependence, and 
confirm the RZ finding that financial development disproportionately boosts the growth rate of 
industries that are more dependent on external finance. Even when controlling for cross-industry 
differences in external dependence, however, we find that financial development disproportionately 
accelerates the growth of industries that for technological reasons are composed of small firms. 
  These results are robust to an array of sensitivity checks. Besides confirming that the results 
hold over different estimation periods, we assess the sensitivity of our findings to using different 
financial development indicators and alternative measures of small-firm share for each industry.  
Furthermore, we were concerned that small-firm share might proxy for other industry characteristics 
that interact with country-level traits to explain industry growth.  For instance, Claessens and 
Laeven (2003) find that industries characterized by high levels of intangible assets grow faster in 
countries with strong private property rights protection.  If small firms have higher levels of 
intangible assets and strong property rights underlie financial development (Levine, 1999), then our 
results on firm size may be spurious.  We confirm our results, however, when controlling for the 
interaction of industrial reliance on intangible assets and national property rights protection.  
Similarly, Fisman and Love (2003b) argue that financial development is particularly important for 
industries with substantial growth opportunities.  If in our sample, small-firm industries are also 
those industries with above average growth opportunities, we may be capturing cross-industry   5
differences in growth opportunities, not cross-industry differences in firm size.  Again, however, 
when controlling for the interaction of financial development and each industry’s growth rate in the 
United States, we continue to find that financial development exerts a particularly large impact on 
the growth of industries that are naturally composed of small firms. Finally, we were concerned that 
market size, human capital skills, and the level of economic development could influence industry 
size, invalidate the use of the U.S. as the benchmark country, and lead to inappropriate inferences.  
Nevertheless, even when controlling for these country-specific traits, we continue to find that 
financial development exerts a particularly pronounced growth-effect on small-firm industries.  
Moreover, we confirm this paper’s findings using the United Kingdom as the benchmark country 
and when employing alternative definitions of industrial firm size.  
  There are limitations to our analyses.  Some theories predict that financial development 
lowers information and transaction costs in ways that are particularly beneficial to small firms.  We 
find evidence consistent with these theories.  We do not, however, examine the links in the chain 
from financial development, to particular information and transaction costs, and on to small firm 
growth.  This is similar to RZ. They find evidence consistent with theories stressing that financial 
development reduces the cost of external finance.  They do not, however, measure the cost of 
external finance directly.  Thus, although this paper’s findings indicate that financial development 
boosts economic growth by fostering the growth of industries that are naturally composed of small 
firms, further research needs to link these findings to specific information and transactions costs.  
Along similar lines, financial market imperfections could impede the growth of small-firm 
industries by causing firm size to deviate from its optimum or by hindering the flow of capital and 
other financial services to small firms.  We do not explicitly distinguish among these possibilities. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2003), however, find no evidence that financial under-  6
development distorts firm size.  Given this finding, our results imply that financial under-
development disproportionately hinders the flow of growth-enhancing financial services to small 
firms.   
  Our paper relates closely to two recent papers that examine the importance of financial 
development for small firms.  Using evidence across different region in Italy, Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2004) find that small firms enjoy more growth benefits than large firms from regional 
financial development.
4  Rather than focusing on inter-regional differences in Italy, we undertake a 
cross-country, country-industry investigation.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) use 
firm-level survey data to assess the relationship between the financing obstacles that firms report 
they face and firm growth.  They find that the negative impact of reported obstacles on firm growth 
is stronger for small firms than large firms and stronger in countries with under-developed financial 
systems.  Their study has the advantage of using cross-country, firm-level data, but it has the 
disadvantage of relying on survey responses regarding the obstacles that firms encounter. In 
contrast, we use a different methodology that assesses whether industries that are naturally 
composed of small firms grow faster in countries with better-developed financial systems.  Our 
research provides complimentary information on whether financial development fosters aggregate 
growth by disproportionately facilitating the growth of small firms. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the data, while 
Section 3 describes the methodology.  Section 4 presents the main results and sensitivity tests. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
4 In terms of new firm formation, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) also find that new firm creation is higher in 
Italian regions that are more financial development. Similarly, Black and Strahan (2002) show that more competitive 
banking markets are associated with higher levels of new incorporations in the United States.   7
II. Data 
To assess whether financial development boosts the growth of industries that for 
technological reasons are naturally composed of small firms more than the growth rate of large-firm 
industries, we need (i) measures of industry growth, (ii) measures of each industry’s technological 
firm size, and (iii) country-level indicators of financial development.  This section describes these 
key variables.  The data cover 44 countries and 36 industries in the manufacturing sector.  Tables 1 
and 2 present descriptive statistics. 
 
II.1. Industry growth rates 
Growthi,k equals the average annual growth rate of real value added of industry k in country 
i over the period 1980 to 1990. Thus, we have cross-country, cross-industry data on industrial 
growth rates.  We use the data obtained by RZ from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook database, 
which is assembled by the United Nations Statistical Division (1993).  In robustness tests below, we 
show that the results hold over different estimation periods.   
 
II.2. Measure of Small Firm Share 
Since our goal is to assess whether industries that are naturally composed of small firms 
grow faster, or slower, than large-firm industries in countries with greater financial development, 
we need to measure each industry’s “natural” or technological firm size.  Differences in productive 
technologies, capital intensities, and scale economies influence an industry’s technological firm size 
(Coase, 1937, and Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001).
5  To get a proxy measure of each industry’s 
natural firm size, therefore, we need a benchmark economy with relatively few market 
                                                 
5 See You (1995) for an overview.    8
imperfections and policy distortions, so that we capture, as closely as possible, only the impact of 
cross-industry differences in production processes, capital intensities, and scale economies on cross-
industry firm size. 
Small Firm Sharek equals industry k’s share of employment in firms with less than 20 
employees in the United States, and is obtained from the 1992 Census.
 6  In our baseline regressions, 
we use Small Firm Share as the measure of each industry’s “natural” or “technological” share of 
small firms.  Table 1 lists the Small Firm Share for each industry in the sample.  The Small Firm 
Share has a mean of 6 %, but varies widely from 0.1 % in manufacturing of pulp, paper and 
paperboard to 21% in wood manufacturing.  In sensitivity checks emphasized below, we consider 
many alternative measures of each industry’s natural firm size and we test for the importance of 
many potential problems associated with using the United States as the benchmark country for 
measuring technological firm size. 
Given our focus on the relationship between financial development, firm size, and growth, it 
is logical to use the United States to form the benchmark measure of an industry’s technological 
share of small firms.  As in RZ, this relies on the assumption that U.S. financial markets are 
relatively frictionless.  Based on this assumption, Small Firm Share measures the share of small 
firms for each industry in a relatively frictionless financial system.  U.S. markets, of course, are not 
perfect.  Indeed, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argue that small firms in the United States are more 
liquidity constrained than large firms.   
Our empirical methods, however, do not require that the U.S. financial system is perfect.  
Rather, we require that financial market imperfections in the United States do not distort the ranking 
of industries in terms of the technological share of small firms within each industry.  Since the   9
United States has one the most developed financial systems in the world by many measures 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001), it represents a natural benchmark for providing a ranking of 
each industry’s technological firm size. 
As noted, the perfect benchmark country has relatively frictionless markets and policies 
distorting firm size beyond the financial sector.  For instance, differences in human capital, market 
size, contract enforcement, and overall institutional development may influence industrial firm size 
beyond technological factors, such as scale economies, capital intensities, and industry-specific 
production processes shaping long-run average cost curves (You, 1995, and Kumar, Rajan, and 
Zingales, 2001).  Thus, the ideal benchmark economy not only has relatively frictionless financial 
markets; it has relatively frictionless markets in general. 
Again, the United States is a reasonable benchmark to derive each industry’s technological 
Small Firm Share.  The United States has the full spectrum of human capital skills and indeed 
attracts both high and low human capital workers from the rest of the world (Easterly and Levine, 
2001).  Furthermore, comparative studies of U.S. and European labor markets suggest that the 
United States has many fewer policy distortions.  Moreover, the U.S. internal market is huge and – 
given its size – it is comparatively open to international trade.  Furthermore, many studies point to 
the United States as having a superior contracting environment and well-developed institutions (La 
Porta et al, 1999).  Moreover, the United States does not need to have perfect labor markets, 
contracting systems, or institutions to act as a reasonable benchmark.  To represent a good 
benchmark for Small Firm Share, we simply require that policy distortions and market 
imperfections in the United States do not distort the ranking of industries in terms of the 
technological share of small firms within each industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 We do not use measures of Small Firm Share prior to 1992 because the U.S. Census did not start collecting firm size 
data at the firm level until 1992.  Before 1992, the data were collected at the plant level. From a theoretical perspective,   10
Furthermore, we present a battery of sensitivity analyses that assess the validity of using the 
United States as the benchmark country.  We use different measures of Small Firm Share and also 
use a different benchmark country.  Furthermore, since omitting country-specific factors that 
interact with industry characteristics and explain industry growth could bias the results, we control 
for an array of country traits.  As we describe below, however, the results are robust to a variety of 
sensitivity checks.  
 
II.3. Indicators of financial development 
Ideally, one would like indicators of the degree to which the financial system ameliorates 
information and transactions frictions and facilitates the mobilization and efficient allocation of 
capital.  Specifically, we would like indicators that capture the effectiveness with which financial 
systems research firms and identify profitable projects, exert corporate control, facilitate risk 
management, mobilize savings, and ease transactions.  Unfortunately, no such measures are 
available across countries.  Consequently, we rely on an assortment of traditional measures of 
financial development that existing work shows are robustly related to economic growth. 
Private Crediti equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP for country i.  It captures the amount of credit channeled through financial 
intermediaries to the private sector.  Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that Private Credit is a 
good predictor or economic growth and also use instrumental variables in stressing that the strong, 
positive association between Private Credit and economic growth is not due to reverse causality.  In 
our baseline regression, we measure Private Credit in the initial year of our estimation period, 1980 
(or the first year in which data are available).  We use the initial year to control for reverse 
causation.   Since using initial values instead of average values implies an informational loss, we 
                                                                                                                                                                  
we need data at the firm level, not the plant level, and we therefore do not resort to Census data prior to 1992.   11
also use Private Credit, averaged over the period 1980-89 in our sensitivity analysis.  Furthermore, 
we use instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of Private Credit.  Data for 
Private Credit are from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).  There is a wide variation in 
Private Credit in our sample, ranging from 7% in Bangladesh to 117% in Japan.  
  In sensitivity tests, we use several alternative indicators of financial development.  To save 
space, we do not define the different financial development measures here.  Rather, we jointly 
define these variables and present the sensitivity analyses below. 
 
III. Methodology 
To examine whether industries that are naturally composed of small firms grow faster than 
large-firm industries in countries with higher levels of financial development, this paper extends the 
methodology developed by RZ.  In particular, we interact an industry characteristic – each 
industry’s technological small firm share – with a country-characteristic – the level of financial 
development.  In describing the econometrics more rigorously, we only discuss the interaction 
between financial development and Small Firm Share.  In the actual implementation, we control for 
the interaction of financial development with the external financial dependence of each industry as 
stressed by RZ.   
Econometrically, we use the following regression: 
, ) * ( , , , k i i k k i
jl
l l j j k i FD Share Firm Small Share Industry Country Growth ε δ γ β α + + + + =∑∑  (1) 
where Growthi,k is the average annual growth rate of value added, in industry k and country i, over 
the period 1980 to 90.  Country and Industry are country and industry dummies, respectively, and 
Sharei,k is the share of industry k in manufacturing in country i in 1980.  Small Firm Sharek is the 
benchmark share of small firms in industry k, which in our baseline specification equals the share of   12
employment in firms with less than 20 employees in the United States in 1992.  FDi is an indicator 
of financial development for country i, which equals Private Credit in our baseline regression.  We 
include the interaction between the small firm share in an industry with financial development.  We 
do not include financial development on its own, since we focus on within-country, within-industry 
growth rates. The dummy variables for industries and countries correct for country and industry 
specific characteristics that might determine industry growth patterns.  We thus isolate the effect 
that the interaction of Small Firm Share and Private Credit has on industry growth relative to 
country and industry means.  By including the initial share of an industry we control for a 
convergence effect: industries with a large share might grow more slowly, suggesting a negative 
sign on γ.  We include the share in manufacturing rather than the level, since we focus on within-
country, within-industry growth rates. We exclude the United States (the benchmark country) from 
the regressions. 
  In interpreting the results, we focus on the interaction of financial development and small 
firms share, i.e., we focus on the sign and significance of δ.  If δ is positive and significant, this 
suggests financial development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small-firm industries 
relative to large-firm industries.  This would suggest that financial development tends to ease 
growth constraints on small firms more than on large firms.  A negative and significant sign would 
suggest that it is mostly large firms that benefit from the development of financial markets.  An 
insignificant coefficient would suggest that financial development influences industries that are 
naturally composed of small firms the same as industries naturally composed of large firms.  Thus, 
if δ enters insignificantly, this would not support the view that financial development has cross-
industry distributional consequences and would not support the view that one channel through   13
which financial development boosts aggregate economic growth is by disproportionately easing 
constrains on small firm growth. 
Apart from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, we also run Instrumental 
Variables (IV) regressions to address the issue of endogeneity of financial development.  Based on 
research by La Porta et al. (1998), Levine (1999), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), and Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), we use the legal origin of countries as instrumental variables 
for financial development.  Legal systems are typically classified into four major legal families: the 
English common law and the French, German, and Scandinavian civil law countries, and we use 
dummy variables for these categories of legal origin as instruments (excluding one category, 
Scandinavian civil law countries, which is included in the constant term).  
 
IV.  Results and Sensitivity Tests 
IV.1. Main Results 
 
Table 3 results suggest that small-firm industries (industries with technologically larger 
shares of small firms) grow faster in economies with better-developed financial intermediaries.  The 
interaction of Private Credit with Small Firm Share enters positively and significantly at the 5% 
level in column (1). We also find that the coefficient on Industry Share enters negatively and 
significantly.  This is consistent with the convergence effect identified by RZ. Overall, these results 
indicate that industries whose organization is based more on small firms than on large firms grow 
faster in countries with better-developed financial intermediaries. 
The relationship between financial development, an industry’s small firm share, and industry 
growth is not only statistically, but also economically large.  To illustrate the effect, we compare the 
growth of an industry with a relatively large share of small firms and an industry with a relative low   14
share of small firms across two countries with different levels of financial development. 
Specifically, the results in column (1) suggest that the furniture industry (75
th percentile of Small 
Firm Share) should grow 1.4% per annum faster than the spinning industry (25
th percentile of Small 
Firm Share) in Canada (75
th percentile of Private Credit) than in India (25
th percentile of Private 
Credit).
7  Since the average growth rate in our sample is 3.4%, this is a relatively large effect. 
Given the influential findings of RZ, we were concerned that there might be a large, 
negative correlation between industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance and 
industries that are naturally composed of small firms.  If this were the case, then it would be 
difficult to distinguish between the RZ finding that externally dependent industries grow faster in 
economies with well-developed financial systems and our result that small-firm industries grow 
faster in economies with well-developed financial systems.  While there is a negative correlation 
between Small Firm Share and External Dependence, it is very small (-0.04) and insignificant. This 
suggests that the industry characteristics explaining firm size distribution are not the same as the 
characteristics explaining technological dependence on external finance. 
Moreover, Table 3 (i) advertises the robustness of the original RZ result on external 
dependence and (ii) illustrates the robustness of the result on industry firm size when controlling for 
external dependence.  As shown in column (2), the interaction between each industry’s level of 
external dependence and financial development (Private Credit * External Dependence) enters 
positively and significantly.  This indicates that industries that are naturally heavy users of external 
finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of financial development.  Since we also 
control for cross-industry differences in the technological level of firm size, this represents an 
additional robustness test on the RZ finding.  Moreover, column (2) shows that the interaction 
between each industry’s technological Small Firm Share and financial development (Private 
                                                 
7 We use the results of column 2 in Table 3 for this experiment.   15
Credit*Small Firm Share) enters positively and significantly when controlling for external 
dependence.  Thus, we find that industries with technologically larger shares of small firms grow 
more quickly in countries with higher levels of financial development even when controlling for 
cross-industry differences in external dependence.
 8 
Finally, Table 3 column (3) presents results using instrumental variables, which indicate that 
the relationship between Small Firm Share, financial development, and industry growth is not due 
to reverse causation or simultaneity bias. Here we extract the exogenous component of Private 
Credit using the legal origin of countries. We instrument both the interaction of Private Credit with 
Small Firm Share and the interaction of Private Credit with External Financial Dependence.  The 
first-stage regression results support the use of legal origin as an instrument for Private Credit.  The 
interaction of Small Firm Share with Private Credit continues to enter positively and significantly.
9   
 
IV.2. Sensitivity to Controlling for Different Industry Characteristics 
There are a number of potential complications with using the United States as the 
benchmark country to identify the technological level of small firm share for each industry.  In 
particular, Small Firm Share in the United States may be correlated with other industry-specific 
traits that interact with country-level characteristics to explain industry growth.  This would produce 
spurious results.   
                                                 
8 In unreported regressions, we also tested whether the interaction between Private Credit and small firm share varies 
across industries with different degrees of external dependence.  The triple interaction term does not enter significantly 
and the interactions of Private Credit with external dependence and the small firm share continue to enter significantly 
and positively, suggesting that small firms consistently face high financing constraints, irrespective of whether they are 
in an industry with a naturally high or low demand for external finance. 
9 We have used alternative instrument sets, including latitude and settler mortality – proxying for initial endowments -, 
religious composition and ethnic fractionalization, factors that have been proposed by the literature has having a 
significant impact on financial and institutional development (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003, Easterly and 
Levine, 1997; Stulz and Williamson, 2004), and obtain similar results.   16
As a sensitivity test, therefore, we include the interaction between financial development 
and different industry traits.  First, as we have emphasized, the results are robust to controlling for 
the interaction of Private Credit with the RZ measure of external financial dependence.  If the Small 
Firm Share is highly (negatively) correlated with External Dependence, the findings on Small Firm 
Share should vanish when controlling for external dependence.  As noted, however, there is not a 
strong correlation between the Small Firm Share and External Dependence and we find that 
financial development exerts a particularly pronounced growth-effect on small-firm industries even 
when controlling for the interaction between financial development and external dependence. 
As a second concern, Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that industries that naturally use a 
high proportion of intangible assets grow faster in countries with strong private property rights 
protection.  If small firms rely heavily on intangible assets and strong private property rights are 
closely associated with financial development, then our findings may simply be confirming the 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) results rather than establishing a new channel linking financial 
development and economic growth.  In Table 4 column 1, we therefore control for the interaction of 
Property Rights with the percentage of intangible assets in each industry.  We use the ratio of 
intangible assets to fixed assets of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 calculated using data 
from Compustat.  We confirm the Claessens and Laeven (2003) result: The interaction of Property 
Rights with Intangibility enters significantly and positively.  However, this does not affect our main 
finding: Industries with a larger small firm share grow faster in economies with better-developed 
financial intermediaries.
10   
Third, we consider the possibility that industries classified as small-firm industries face 
different growth opportunities than industries composed of larger firms, which might lead us to 
spuriously link industrial firm size with faster economic growth in financial developed economies.    17
Fisman and Love (2003b) argue that financial development boosts the growth rate of industries with 
particularly good growth opportunities.  Thus, we want to assess the independent importance of the 
relationship between industry growth and the interaction between financial development and Small 
Firm Share when controlling for cross-industry growth opportunities.  Thus, in Table 4’s column 2, 
we follow Fisman and Love (2003b) and also include the interaction between Private Credit and 
their measure of industrial Sales Growth to control for growth opportunities. Sales Growth is 
calculated as real annual growth in net sales of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data 
from Compustat.  Even when controlling for both external dependence and growth opportunities, 
the interaction of Small Firm Share with Private Credit enters positively and significantly.   
 
IV.3. Sensitivity to Controlling for Different Country Characteristics 
There may also exist concerns that financial development is highly correlated with other 
country-specific traits that interact with industry firm size and shape cross-industry growth rates.  
To examine the sensitivity of the results to different country factors, we choose country traits that 
on theoretical grounds are associated with financial development and influence industry firm size 
and growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Galor and Moav, 2005).  Specifically, we include the 
interaction between Small Firm Share and country characteristics besides financial development. 
Thus, in Table 4, columns 3 – 5, we control for the interaction of (i) the log of GDP per 
capita with the Small Firm Share, (ii) average years of schooling with the Small Firm Share, and 
(iii) openness to trade with the Small Firm Share.  Small firms might benefit from a generally more 
developed institutional environment.  Thus, we include the overall level of economic development.  
If financial development is simply proxying for the overall level of institutional development, then 
including the interaction between Per Capita GDP and Small Firm Share should drive out the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
10 We also tried an interaction of intangibility and financial development and obtained similar results.    18
significance of the interaction between financial development and Small Firm Share.  Similarly, a 
more educated population might be more conducive to the growth of industries composed of 
smaller (or larger) firms since technical, entrepreneurial, and managerial skills influence industrial 
organization and growth.  If financial development is closely linked with human capital 
development, then controlling for the interaction between Small Firm Share and Human Capital (as 
measured by each country’s average years of schooling of the population over the age of 25) should 
drive out the results on industrial firm size.  Finally, market size may be associated with financial 
development, industrial firm size, and the growth rate of different industries.  For instance, 
industries that depend on relatively large firms may grow faster in economies with larger markets 
that allow them to exploit economies of scale more fully.  To test this, we include the interaction 
between Small Firm Share and a proxy measure of openness to international trade, Openness, which 
equals exports plus imports divided by GDP.   
The finding that financial development disproportionately boosts the growth of industries 
that are naturally composed of small firms holds even when controlling for these other country 
characteristics.  The interaction of Private Credit with Small Firm Share enters positively and 
significantly in Table 4’s columns 3 – 5.  The interaction of Per Capita GDP and Small Firm Share 
and the interaction between Openness and Small Firm Share do not enter significantly in columns 3 
and 5 respectively.  The interaction of Human Capital and Small Firm Share enters positively and 
significantly at the 10% level, which provides some support to the view that small-firm industries 
grow faster in economies with more educated work forces.  However, this does not affect the 
significance or size of the interaction term of Small Firm Share with Private Credit.  Thus, this 
paper’s core results on financial development, industrial firm size, and industry growth are robust to 
controlling for different country characteristics.   19
 
IV.4. Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Industrial Small Firm Share 
Table 5 indicates that the results are robust to using alternative definitions of Small Firm 
Share.  In all of these regressions, we control for the interaction between financial development and 
external dependence.  We use four different cut-offs to define a small firm: 5, 10, 100 and 500 
employees respectively.
11  Table 1 lists Small Firm Share for different for the different definitions 
of a small firm.  There is a high correlation among the different measures of Small Firm Share, and 
the average correlation is 91%.
12  Nevertheless, some additional information may be garnered from 
examining the results with different cut-offs.  This allows us to (a) test the robustness of the results 
to different definitions of a small firm and (b) assess more fully the relationship between cross-
industry firm size, financial development, and growth.   
Using the alternative definitions of a small firm does not change our main finding: Financial 
development fosters the growth of small-firm industries more than large-firm industries, though the 
significance of the interaction term between Private Credit and Small Firm Share is significant only 
at the ten percent level when defining a small firm as having 100 or fewer employees.  We also find 
that once we include firms up to 500 employees in the definition of Small Firm Share, then the 
interaction of financial development and firm size distribution turns insignificant.  Thus, these 
sensitivity checks (i) emphasize that financial development exerts a particularly large growth effect 
on small-firm industries and (ii) indicate “small-firm” industries that enjoy a disproportionately 
large growth effect from financial include industries with a large share of firms with less than 100 
employees. 
                                                 
11 Note that we loose two industries due to missing data in the U.S. Census when we use 5 and 10 employees as cut-off. 
12 Not surprisingly, the correlation decreases as we move towards higher thresholds.  The correlation between S5 and 
S10 is 99%, but 78% between S5 and S500.   20
We also find that the economic size of the impact of financial development on industries 
with different Small Firm Shares is robust to using different definitions of small firm share.  
Specifically, using the example above, moving from India (25
th percentile Private Credit) to Canada 
(75
th percentile Private Credit) benefits the industry at the 75
th percentile of Small Firm Share 
relatively more than the industry at the 25
th percentile of Small Firm Share.  According to the 
estimated coefficients, this change induces a 1.4% growth differential between these two types of 
industries using 20 employees as the cut-off definition for a small firm.  For example, the growth 
differentials are virtually identical (1.6% and 1.5 % growth differential respectively) when using 10 
or 5 employees as alternative definitions of small firm in categorizing the technological level of 
small firm share.  Given that we control for the interaction of financial development with external 
financial dependence, these results suggest that small-firm industries benefit more than large-firm 
industries from financial development.  
Next, we were concerned that using indicators of Small Firm Share that are measured after 
the dependent variable would induce biases.  While we cannot measure Small Firm Share in earlier 
periods due to the data constraints discussed above, we can assess whether Small Firm Share is 
stable and then see whether using Small Firm Share from a different year alters the results.  The 
correlation between the small firm shares in 1992 and 1997 using the 20-employee cut-off is 90%, 
significant at the 1% level, and the Spearman rank correlation is 92%.  This suggests that firm size 
distribution across industries in the United States is persistent and does not vary significantly over 
the business cycle (in 1992, the U.S. economy was just emerging from a recession, while 1997 was 
a boom year).   
Moreover, this paper’s findings are also robust to measuring Small Firm Share for U.S. 
industries in 1997 instead of 1992.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results when using the   21
Small Firm Share across U.S. industries when using the 1997 Census and 10 or 20 employees as the 
cut-off.  Using the 1997 data does not change our findings: the interaction of the Small Firm Share 
with Private Credit enters positively and significantly at the 1% level.   
Critically, we also confirm the robustness of the results when using the United Kingdom as 
the benchmark economy for computing each industry’s technological firm size. We use AMADEUS 
data for 1997 to calculate the small firm share across industries for the United Kingdom. 
AMADEUS is a commercial database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk containing financial 
statements and employment data for over 5 million firms in Europe, including the United Kingdom. 
Unfortunately, the data on industrial firm size distribution is not as complete for the United 
Kingdom as for the United States.
13 Nevertheless, we continue to find that small-firm industries 
grow faster in countries with well-developed financial systems.  The interaction of Small Firm 
Share in the United Kingdom and Private Credit enters positively and significantly at the 5% level 
(Table 6 column 3), which again confirms this paper’s core conclusion.   
Finally, the results are robust to controlling for the average size of large firms in each 
industry.  We were concerned that industry variation in the size of the largest firms could reflect 
U.S. specific factors and distort our results.  Thus, we control for the median size of the large, listed 
firms by industry in the United States, using Compustat data to calculate the log of the median 
number of employees across large, listed firms in the United States.  The regressions in columns (4) 
and (5) of Table 6 show that the interaction of Private Credit with the median firm size of large, 
listed firms does not enter significantly in any of the regressions at the 5% level.  In contrast, we 
                                                 
13 Unlike for the U.S. Census, for the U.K. dataset we only have complete data for enterprises above 10 employees so 
that our U.K. small firm share is calculated as employment in enterprises between 10 and 20 employees relative to 
employment in enterprises with more than 10 employees. We only include limited liability companies in our 
calculations, since in the United Kingdom unlimited liability companies are not required to file financial accounts (for 
further details, see Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2004). Also, we exclude industries with less than 20 firm-observations.  
The correlation between the small firm shares for industries in the U.S. in 1992 and small firm shares in the U.K. in 
1997 is 58%, significant at the 1% level and the Spearman rank correlation is 52%.     22
continue to find that the interaction of Private Credit and Small Firm Share enters positively and 
significantly at the 5% level.   
IV.5. Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
The findings are also robust to using alternative measures of financial development as 
shown in Table 7.  First, we use Private Credit, averaged over the period 1980 to 1989 instead of 
using the value in the initial year.  While using the average value may introduce a bias in our 
estimates, the interaction with the Small Firm Share enters positively and significantly at the 1% 
level, and the coefficient is only slighter higher than when using the initial value (regression 1).   
Second, we use Liquid Liabilities, which equals the liquid liabilities of the financial system 
(currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial 
intermediaries) divided by GDP.  Unlike Private Credit, Liquid Liabilities simply measures the size 
financial intermediaries and does not focus on the intermediation of credit to the private sector.  As 
shown in Table 7 regression 2, the results hold when using Liquid Liabilities.
 14   
Third, we test whether small-firm industries grow faster in economies with more active 
stock markets.  Market Turnover equals the ratio of the value of stock transactions divided by 
market capitalization for each country’s stock exchange.  While the interaction with the Small Firm 
Share is positive, it is not significant (Table 7 regression 3).  This suggests that, consistent with 
Petersen and Rajan (1995), small firms benefit more from services provided by financial 
intermediaries than by stock markets.
15   
Fourth, we use several indicators that do not directly measure the size or efficiency of the 
financial system, but instead measure the institutional foundations for financial development. 
Specifically, we also use Legal Efficiency, which measures the efficiency and integrity of a 
                                                 
14 These results also hold when using Commercial-Central Bank from Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).   
15 These results hold when using stock market capitalization and value traded as alternative stock market indicators.    23
country’s legal environment. Data are averaged over 1980-83 and are originally from Business 
International Corporation.  Also, we use the Law and Order index compiled by ICRG, which is 
based on survey data that seek to elicit the degree of trust that citizens have in the legal system’s 
ability to resolve disputes.  Finally, we use Accounting Standards, which measures the number of 
items listed on firms’ financial statements, an indicator ranging from zero to 90 and compiled by 
CIFAR.  Accounting Standards is a proxy for the quality of financial information about firms and 
has been used by RZ as a proxy for financial development.  As shown in Table 7, the interaction 
between Legal Efficiency and Small Firm Share and the interaction between the Law and Order and 
Small Firm Share both enter positively and significantly at the 5% level (columns 4 and 5).  The 
interaction of Accounting Standards with Small Firm Share, however, enters insignificantly 
(column 6).  This suggests that the quality of financial statements does not foster disproportionately 
faster growth in small-firm industries.  This finding is consistent with the insignificant result for the 
interaction of Turnover with Small Firm Share and emphasizes the particularly large, positive 
relationship between the development of financial intermediaries and the growth rate of industries 
that are naturally composed of small firms.  While not direct evidence, this result is consistent with 
arguments that small firms rely on financial intermediaries to obtain information on the firm 
through means other than publicly available financial statements (such as information deriving from 
long-term bank-firm relationships), so that financial intermediary development induces a 
particularly large, positive effect on small firms.  
IV.6. Sensitivity to Alternative Sampling Period 
  As a robustness test, we use industry value added growth over an extended period, 1980 
through 1999.  The core sample includes 1242 country-industry observations for the period 1980 to 
1990 (the original RZ sample).  When we move to the extended period, the sample drops by one-  24
third to only 827 country-industry observations because we lose data on several countries and 
industries.   
Nevertheless, the results in Table 8 indicate that our main findings are robust to calculating 
industry growth over this longer period.  The results in columns 1 and 2 confirm a significant and 
positive coefficient on the interaction of Small Firm Share and financial development when using 
(i) industry growth rates over the period 1980-99 and (ii) defining Small Firm Share with either the 
10 or 20 employees cut-off.  The regression in column 3 suggests that the significance over the 
longer period is not due to the reduced sample because the results for the 1980s also hold for the 
smaller sample for which we have data through 1999.   
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper finds that financial development boosts the growth of industries that are naturally 
composed of small firms more than large-firm industries.  This result is robust to controlling for 
other industry characteristics, many country traits, different measures of financial development, 
various methods for computing the technological firm size of industries, and alternative estimation 
samples.  The results imply that one way in which financial development boosts growth is by 
relieving constraints on the growth of small firms. 
This result has three interrelated implications.  First, this paper contributes to the literature 
on the mechanisms through which financial development boosts aggregate economic growth.  
Although a large literature shows that there is a strong positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, it is crucial to dissect the channels connecting finance and 
growth to (i) better understand the finance-growth nexus and (ii) assess whether finance causes 
growth, or whether financial development is simply a characteristic of successful economies.  Past 
work suggests that financial development facilitates economic growth by boosting the growth of   25
firms that rely heavily on external finance.  Besides confirming this finding, we show that financial 
development fosters economic growth by relieving constraints on small firm growth.  Thus, we 
identify an additional mechanism through which financial development fosters aggregate economic 
growth.  Second, this paper’s findings support the view that financial development 
disproportionately boosts the growth of small firms relative to large firms.  Some theories of the 
firm argue that financial development is particularly beneficial to large firms.  Others predict that 
financial development is especially important for lowering transaction costs and informational 
barriers that hinder small firm growth.  Our findings support the view that under-developed 
financial systems are particularly detrimental to the growth of firms with less than 100 employees.  
Finally, we find that financial development has cross-industry distributional consequences.  
Although we do not examine specific policies, the results suggest that policies that improve the 
operation of the financial system will tend to boost the growth of small-firm industries more than 
large firm industries.   26
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Table 1  Firm Size Distribution in the United States in 1992 
 
This table shows employment shares by firm size bin in the United States by ISIC Revision 2 industries. Sx is the industry’s share 
of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the 
year 1992. Employment shares are expressed in percentages of total number of employees. 
 
ISIC Industry  name  S5  S10  S20  S100  S500 
311 Food  manufacturing  0.56 1.68  3.82 13.77 28.71
313 Beverage  industries  0.60 1.76  4.04 14.75 30.66
314 Tobacco  manufactures 0.09 0.20  0.30 1.49 5.14
321 Manufacture  of  textiles  0.40 1.17  2.81 13.43 32.95
322  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear  1.30 3.60  8.18  31.74 58.39
323 
Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather substitutes 
and fur, except footwear and wearing apparel  1.94 4.78  10.45  36.89 61.08
324 
Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or molded rubber or 
plastic footwear  0.31 0.81 1.61 7.40 30.89
331 
Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products, except 
furniture  4.20 11.20 21.37 47.31 67.42
332  Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal  1.57 4.19  9.09  28.74 50.78
341  Manufacture of paper and paper products     3.03 16.16 33.60
342  Printing, publishing and allied industries  3.64 9.16  16.32  35.80 51.65
352  Manufacture of other chemical products  0.87 2.68  5.80  17.67 31.53
353  Petroleum  refineries  0.05 0.18 0.36 1.90 5.67
354  Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal  1.26 3.93  9.26  29.80 52.11
355  Manufacture of rubber products  0.38 1.21  3.15  13.23 27.46
356  Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified  0.69 2.24  6.09  27.19 54.98
361  Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware  2.30 4.91  8.80  26.52 41.71
362  Manufacture of glass and glass products  1.15 2.82  5.05  13.92 24.41
369  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral  products  1.87 5.88 14.17 40.78 60.42
371  Iron and steel basic industries  0.20 0.59  1.62  8.05 23.38
372  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.50 1.78  4.76  18.65 37.07
381 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment  1.28 4.07 9.98  33.87 55.62
382  Manufacture of machinery except electrical  2.15 6.37 13.68 34.60 50.87
383 
Manufacture of electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and 
supplies 0.50 1.48  3.44  14.18 28.97
384  Manufacture of transport equipment  0.18 0.54  1.21  4.20 8.15
385 
Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and 
controlling equipment not elsewhere classified, and of 
photographic and optical goods  0.68 1.87  4.01  12.88 25.74
390 Other  Manufacturing  Industries  3.54 8.72 16.95 43.48 66.66
3211  Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles  0.26 0.73  1.91  9.14 24.54
3411  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard     0.14 1.29 7.27
3511  Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers  0.29 0.89  1.75  6.51 12.90
3513 
Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made 
fibers except glass  0.11 0.31 0.66 3.17 8.41
3522  Manufacture of drugs and medicines  0.26 0.86  2.10  8.09 18.46
3825  Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery  0.48 1.32  2.85  10.43 21.67
3832 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus  0.57 1.40  3.09  11.67 27.85
3841  Ship building and repairing  1.73 3.58  6.56  16.35 30.26
3843  Manufacture of motor vehicles  0.32 1.00  2.28  8.04 17.62
Average   1.07 2.88  5.85  18.42 33.75  30
 
Table 2  Summary statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis.  Country-industry variables: Growth in real value 
added is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1989 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the 
industry’s share in total value added of the country.  Industry variables:  Small firms share (empl<x) is the industry’s share of 
employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 
1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). Intangibility is a measure of the industry’s dependence on intangible assets from Claessens and Laeven (2003). Sales 
growth is an industry measure of sales growth from Fisman and Love (2003b). Industry size is the logarithm of the industry’s 
median number of employees, and is calculated using data for the year 1980 on U.S. listed firms from Compustat. UK Small firms 
share is the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using firm-level data from 
Amadeus on all U.K. limited liability firms with 10 or more employees for the year 1997 (we exclude industries with less than 20 
firm-observations).  Country variables: Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 
1980. Liquid liabilities is liquid liabilities to GDP in 1980. Market turnover is total value of trades to total value of shares averaged 
in 1980. Per capita GDP is the logarithm of the country’s real GDP per capita in 1980. Accounting standards is an index of the 
quality of accounting standards in 1990. Legal efficiency is the measure of the country’s efficiency of the legal system used by 
LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1980-1983. Law and order is an index of the law and order tradition in the country 
from LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1982-1995. Property rights is a measure of the country’s protection of property 
rights from the Heritage Foundation. Average for the years 1995-99. Human capital is average years of schooling  in population 
age over 25 in the year 1980.  
Variable Mean Median St.dev. Minimum Maximum 
   
Panel A: Country-industry variables   
Growth in real value added  0.034 0.029 0.099 -0.447 1.000 
Share in value added  0.016 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.224 
       
Panel B: Industry variables       
Small firms share (empl<5)  0.011 0.006 0.011 0.001 0.042 
Small firms share (empl<10)  0.029 0.018 0.027 0.002 0.112 
Small firms share (empl<20)  0.059 0.039 0.053 0.001 0.214 
Small firms share (empl<100)  0.184 0.14 0.13 0.013 0.473 
Small firms share (empl<500)  0.337 0.305 0.183 0.051 0.674 
External financial dependence  0.319 0.231 0.406 -0.451 1.492 
Intangibility 0.625 0.460 0.810 0.020 4.540 
Sales growth  0.045 0.042 0.037 -0.037 0.129 
Industry size  2.309 1.225 2.649 0.250 10.60 
UK Small firms share  0.010 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.037 
       
Panel C: Country variables       
Private Credit  0.425 0.341 0.270 0.073 1.173 
Liquid liabilities  0.487 0.447 0.234 0.142 1.342 
   
Market turnover  0.157 0.109 0.164 0.001 0.712 
Per capita GDP  7.791 7.860 1.334 4.793 9.573 
Human capital  5.811 5.313 2.853 1.681 12.141 
Property rights  3.966 4.000 0.879 2.000 5.000 
Accounting standards  0.613 0.620 0.132 0.240 0.830 
Legal efficiency  7.704 7.375 2.012 2.500 10.000 
Law and order  6.692 6.575 2.770 1.900 10.000 
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Table 3  Financial development, small firms share, and growth 
 
Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. 
Share in value added is the industry’s share in total value added of the country.  Private Credit is claims by financial 
institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980. Small firms share is the industry’s share of employment 
by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the 
year 1992. External dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). The industry measures are based on U.S. data. The regression in column (3) is estimated using 
legal origin dummies as instrumental variable for Private Credit. All regressions include country and industry 
dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS  OLS  IV 
Share in value added  -1.012***  -1.095***  -1.086*** 
  (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) 
Private Credit * Small firm share  0.409**  0.445**  0.567** 
  (0.172) (0.173) (0.220) 
Private Credit * External dependence    0.144***  0.101*** 
   (0.039)  (0.037) 
     
Observations  1242 1242 1242 
R-squared  0.26 0.28 0.27 
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Table 4  Controlling for Additional Industry and Country Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry’s share in 
total value added of the country.  Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980.  Property rights is a measure of 
the country’s protection of property rights from the Heritage Foundation. Average for the years 1995-99. We  reverse the original order of the index such that 
higher values indicate more protection (score of 1-5). Per capita GDP is the logarithm of the country’s real GDP per capita in 1980. Human capital is average 
years of schooling in population age over 25 in the year 1980. Openness is the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP in 1980. Small firms share is the 
industry’s share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. 
External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Intangibility is a measure of the 
industry’s dependence on intangible assets from Claessens and Laeven (2003), and is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets of U.S. firms over 
the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. Sales growth is an industry measure of sales growth from Fisman and Love (2003b), and is calculated as real 
annual growth in net sales of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include 
country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Share  in  value  added  -1.114*** -1.108*** -1.089*** -0.955*** -1.155*** 
  (0.255) (0.255) (0.258) (0.253) (0.265) 
Private Credit * Small firms share  0.356**  0.468***  0.485**  0.457**  0.500*** 
  (0.167) (0.176) (0.190) (0.186) (0.188) 
Private Credit * External financial dependence  0.139***  0.092**  0.143***  0.121***  0.141*** 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Property  rights  *  Intangibility  0.008***      
  (0.003)      
Private Credit * Sales growth    0.774*       
    (0.425)     
Per capita GDP * Small firms share      -0.013  -0.156*  -0.012 
      (0.043) (0.081) (0.046) 
Human capital * Small firms share        0.071**   
      (0.028)   
Openness*Small  Firm  share       0.000 
       (0.002) 
       
Observations  1242 1242 1242 1207 1215 
R-squared  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.27   33
    
Table 5  Alternative measures of firm size distribution 
 
Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry’s share in 
total value added of the country.  Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980.  Small firms share (empl<x) is 
the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. 
External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The industry measures are based 
on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share in value added  -1.134***  -1.139***  -1.095***  -1.076***  -1.055*** 
  (0.265) (0.266) (0.253) (0.251) (0.249) 
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<5)  2.807***         
  (0.911)      
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<10)    1.141***       
   (0.353)       
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<20)      0.445**     
     (0.173)     
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<100)        0.130*   
      (0.072)   
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<500)          0.045 
       (0.051) 
Private Credit * External financial dependence  0.154***  0.153***  0.144***  0.142***  0.141*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
       
Observations  1170 1170 1242 1242 1242 
R-squared  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 
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Table 6  Alternative small firm data and controlling for the size of large firms 
 
Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry’s share in 
total value added of the country.  Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980.  Small firms share (empl<x) is 
the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1997. 
UK Small firms share is the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using firm-level data from Amadeus on all 
U.K. limited liability firms with 10 or more employees for the year 1997 (we exclude industries with less than 20 firm-observations). Industry size in 1980 is the 
log of the median number of employees across all U.S. listed firms in Compustat. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on 
external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not 
reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Share in value added  -1.146***  -1.129***  -1.055***  -1.079***  -1.120*** 
  (0.273)  (0.292)  (0.259) (0.255) (0.268) 
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<20) in 1997  0.685***      0.603***   
 (0.249)      (0.198)   
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<10) in 1997    1.522***      1.403*** 
   (0.507)      (0.390) 
Private Credit * UK Small firms share      1.696**     
     (0.827)     
Private Credit * External financial dependence  0.157***  0.191***  0.153***  0.175***  0.182*** 
  (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.042) (0.044) (0.045) 
Private Credit * Industry size in 1980        0.020*  0.019 
       (0.012)  (0.013) 
         
Observations  1102  1005  1180 1242 1170 
R-squared  0.28  0.29  0.28 0.28 0.28 
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Table 7  Alternative measures of financial development 
 
Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry’s share in 
total value added of the country. Private credit 1980-89 is the country’s private credit to GDP averaged over the period 1980-89. Liquid liabilities is liquid 
liabilities to GDP in 1980. Market turnover is total value of trades to total value of shares in 1980. Accounting standards is an index of the quality of accounting 
standards in 1990. Legal efficiency is the measure of the country’s efficiency of the legal system used by LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1980-
1983. Law and order is an index of the law and order tradition in the country from LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1982-1995. Small firms share is 
the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. 
External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The industry measures are based 
on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share in value added  -1.127***  -1.043***  -1.020*** -0.794*** -0.827*** -0.669*** 
  (0.255) (0.251) (0.257) (0.195) (0.210) (0.209) 
Private credit 1980-89 * Small firms share  0.444***           
  (0.161)       
Private credit 1980-89 * External financial dependence  0.097***           
        
Liquid liabilities * Small firms share    0.399**         
    (0.184)      
Liquid liabilities * External financial dependence    0.085***         
    (0.032)      
Market turnover * Small firms share      0.018       
     (0.234)      
Market turnover * External financial dependence      0.074**       
     (0.036)      
Legal efficiency * Small firms share        0.053***     
      (0.020)    
Legal efficiency * External financial dependence        0.009***     
      (0.003)    
Law and order * Small firms share          0.053***   
       (0.020)   
Law and order * External financial dependence          0.007***   
       (0.002)   
Accounting standards * Small firms share            0.363 
        (0.244) 
Accounting standards * External financial dependence            0.158*** 
        (0.034) 
        
Observations  1242 1242 1222 1174 1174 1067 
R-squared  0.27 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.35 
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Table 8  Alternative dependent variable: Growth over the period 1980-99 
 
Dependent variable in columns (1) to (2) is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1999 by country and ISIC 
industry. Dependent variable in columns (3) is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC 
industry. Share in value added is the industry’s share in total value added of the country.   Share in value added is the industry’s 
share in total value added of the country. Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 
1980.  Small firms share (empl<x) is the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated 
using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry’s 
dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The sample in column (3) is restricted to those observations that 
take non-missing values for the average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1999 variable. The industry measures are 
based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Growth over 1980 to 1999  Growth over 1980 to 
1990 
Share in value added  -0.330  -0.334  -1.293*** 
 (0.224)  (0.221)  (0.306) 
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<20)  0.249*    0.852*** 
 (0.141)    (0.265) 
Private Credit * Small firms share (empl<10)    0.568**   
   (0.258)   
Private Credit * External financial dependence  0.067**  0.070**  0.107** 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.046) 
      
Observations 827  805  827 
R-squared 0.33  0.33  0.31 
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Annex 1  Firm Size Distribution in the United States in 1997 
 
This table shows SME shares in the United States by ISIC Revision 2 industries. Sx is the industry’s share of employment by firms 
with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1997. SME shares are 
expressed in percentages of total number of employees. 
 
ISIC Industry  name  S5  S10  S20  S100  S500 
311 Food  manufacturing  0.53 1.61  3.68 13.01 27.01
313 Beverage  industries  0.80 2.22  4.70 16.38 33.29
314 Tobacco  manufactures     0.55 3.03 9.02
321 Manufacture  of  textiles  0.44 1.23  2.95 13.29 30.57
322  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear  1.53 4.40  10.04  34.42 57.26
323 
Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather substitutes 
and fur, except footwear and wearing apparel      10.17  31.95 57.93
324 
Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or molded rubber or 
plastic footwear  0.52 1.18 2.18  10.29 31.54
331 
Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products, except 
furniture  3.80 9.90 19.50 43.78 63.82
332  Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal  1.39 3.92  8.62  28.53 50.69
341  Manufacture of paper and paper products       32.16
342  Printing, publishing and allied industries  3.24 8.27  15.08  34.47 50.66
352  Manufacture of other chemical products  0.89 2.63  5.93  18.08 33.36
353  Petroleum  refineries  0.04 0.09 0.21 1.60 6.72
354  Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal     9.01 27.90 47.10
355  Manufacture of rubber products  0.32 1.07  2.90  12.65 26.91
356  Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified  0.63 2.03  5.44  25.23 50.88
361  Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware  2.34 5.31  9.42  26.95 50.41
362  Manufacture of glass and glass products       24.21
369  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products       58.54
371  Iron and steel basic industries  0.16 0.46  1.20  7.73 23.18
372  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.42 1.40  3.77  17.12 36.82
381 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment  1.10 3.69 9.46  34.59 57.75
382  Manufacture of machinery except electrical  1.98 5.73 12.26 33.37 51.05
383 
Manufacture of electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and 
supplies 0.45 1.31  3.07  12.78 28.43
384  Manufacture of transport equipment  0.46 1.32  3.05  12.55 28.25
385 
Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and 
controlling equipment not elsewhere classified, and of 
photographic and optical goods  0.44 1.12  2.29  7.56 15.98
390 Other  Manufacturing  Industries  0.78 2.17  4.73 15.34 28.50
3211  Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles  0.61 1.46  2.85  10.00 26.75
3411  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard       8.74
3511  Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers  0.38 0.87  1.83  7.23 15.46
3513 
Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made 
fibers except glass  0.19 0.43 1.11 5.86 12.90
3522  Manufacture of drugs and medicines  0.33 0.91  2.13  8.93 20.94
3825  Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery  0.47 1.29  2.81  9.42 20.31
3832 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus  0.51 1.34  3.00  11.50 27.45
3841  Ship building and repairing  2.12 4.63  8.01  19.44 36.19
3843  Manufacture of motor vehicles  0.31 0.87  1.91  6.97 17.12
Average   0.94 2.51  5.43  17.56 33.28
  